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Abstract
Background: In the field of road safety epidemiology, it is common to use responsibility analyses to
assess the effect of a given factor on the risk of being responsible for an accident, among drivers involved
in an accident only. Using the Structural Causal Model framework, we formally showed in previous works
that the causal odds-ratio of a given factor correlated with high speed cannot be unbiasedly estimated
through responsibility analyses if inclusion into the dataset depends on the crash severity. And in practice,
the selection always depends on the crash severity.
Objective: The objective of this present work is to present numerical results to give a first quantification
of the magnitude of the selection bias induced by responsibility analyses.
Method: We denote the following binary variables by X the exposure of interest, V the high speed,
F the driving fault, R the responsibility of a severe accident, A the severe accident, and W a set
of categorical confounders. We illustrate the potential bias by comparing the causal effect of inter-
est of X on R, COR (X,R|W = w), and the estimable odds-ratio available in responsibility analyses,
OR (X,R|W = w,A = 1), under a given choice of a joint distribution of (X,V, F,A,W ). By considering
a binary exposure, and by varying a set of parameters, we describe a situation where this exposure X
could represent alcohol, and under additional assumptions, cannabis intoxication.
Results: We confirm that the estimable odds-ratio available in responsibility analyses is a biased measure
of the causal effect when X is correlated with high speed V and V is related to the accident severity A.
In this case, the magnitude of the bias is all the more important that these two relationships are strong.
When X is likely to increase the risk to drive fast V , the estimable odds-ratio in responsibility analyses
underestimates the causal effect. When X is likely to decrease the risk to drive fast V , the estimable
odds-ratio upper estimates the causal effect. In this latter case, we especially show that a reverse direction
of the estimable odds-ratio to the causal effect of interest can occur.
Conclusion: The values of the different causal quantities considered here are from one to five times
higher (or lower) than the estimable quantity available in responsability analyses. Under additional
assumptions, it is possible to observe a reverse direction. This article is the first to give a quantification
of the magnitude of the bias induced by responsibility analyses and it gives new keys to well interpret
the estimable odds-ratio available in such analyses.
Keywords: causal inference ; Structural Causal Model framework; Directed Acyclic Graph; collider bias;
responsibility analysis; road safety epidemiology.
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Introduction
Data selection mechanism poses a challenge to unbiasedly estimate the effect of a given exposure on an event. The
famous “obesity paradox” that reports an association between obesity and a decreased mortality in individuals
suffering from a chronic disease is a good example of how inclusion into the dataset can create bias [1, 2]. This type
of bias is known as a more general phenomenon called “collider bias” [3, 4], and it is also at play in road safety
epidemiology [5].
In the field of road safety epidemiology, the collider bias occurs because the inclusion into the dataset depends in
particular on the outcome of interest, the accident and even the severe accident. Indeed, road safety data are usually
available when the accident occurs. Moreover, available data are often restricted to drivers and vehicles involved in
severe road accidents only (e.g., injury or fatal accidents) [6]. To circumvent the issue of the absence of a control
group, it is common to use responsibility analyses [7, 8, 9, 10] and to assess the effect of a given factor on the risk
of being responsible for an accident, among drivers involved in an accident only. The general assumption is that
non-responsible drivers represent a random sample of the general driving population that was selected to crash by
circumstances beyond their control and therefore have the same risk factor profile as other drivers on the road at the
same time [10, 11]. Then, a standard claim is that “if this randomness assumption is met, then the risk estimate
derived from a responsibility analysis would be expected to be similar to that from a case-control study” [10, 11].
Some authors have raised questions about the validity of these approaches [12] and have sensed the presence of a
residual selection bias [13] but the presence of this bias had never been formally proved yet. Consequently, in the
absence of a more relevant alternative, responsibility analyses are now widely adopted in the field [14, 15, 16].
Using the Structural Causal Model framework (SCM) [17, 18], we formally showed in previous works [5] that the
randomness assumption does not hold in particular when inclusion in the study depends on the crash severity, through
speed, and speed is affected by the considered exposure. In practice, the inclusion into the dataset always depends on
the crash severity. On the other hand, alcohol is a well-known cause of car accidents. Since it is commonly admitted
that alcohol increases the risk to drive fast, our results suggest that the estimation regarding the risk of alcohol is
biased and more precisely underestimated [5].
The objective of this article is to present numerical results to give a first accurate quantification of the magnitude
of the selection bias induced by responsibility analyses. We illustrate the potential bias by comparing the causal
effect of interest and the estimable odds-ratio available in responsibility analyses, under a given choice of a joint
distribution of covariates involved in the mechanism leading to a severe accident. By considering a binary exposure,
and by varying a set of parameters, we describe a situation where this exposure could represent alcohol, and under
additional assumptions, cannabis intoxication.
2
1 Methods
1.1 SCM framework and recoverability of causal effects in responsibility analy-
ses
Here, we give a brief description of the causal model which leads to a severe accident and remind of the issue of collider
bias in responsibility analyses. Referring to Figure 1, our interest is in the relationship between the exposure X (e.g.,
alcool or cannabis) and the binary outcome R (i.e., responsibility for a severe accident), among drivers involved in a
severe accident (A = 1). Our causal mechanism includes F , the binary variable indicating whether the driver commits
a driving fault, and V the binary variable indicating whether a given driver drives at high speed. We consider here
a simple case where W denotes a unique binary confounder. We will denote by V the set of observable variables
(X,F, V,A,R,W ). More details about this causal mechanism can be found in [5]. Moreover, because selection bias is
present, we add in a specific fashion the binary variable S indicating inclusion in the study [19, 20].
X F A
S
W
V
R
Figure 1: DAGs Gs in responsibility analyses
Let us precise that the binary variable R is defined so that R = F ×A and that we have:

R = 1 if and only if A = 1 and F = 1
R = 0 if A = 1 and F = 0
R = 0 if A = 0 even if F = 1.
In the SCM framework, the causal mechanism leading to R, the DAG (directed acyclic graph) [21, 22, 23], is associated
to a set of structural functions, each corresponding to one of the covariates in the DAG. This set of equations allows
the definition of Rx, the counterfactual outcome that would have been observed in the counterfactual world where
exposure would have been set to X = x, for x ∈ {0, 1}. Then, causal quantities can be precisely defined. Here, we
will focus on the w-specific causal odds-ratio of X on R, i.e., the causal odds-ratio in the stratum of the population
defined by W = w. It is defined as follows:
COR (X,R|W = w) = P (R1 = 1|W = w) /P (R1 = 0|W = w)
P (R0 = 1|W = w) /P (R0 = 0|W = w)
Causal inference is mainly concerned with the identifiability of causal quantities. In our case, COR (X,R|W = w) is
identifiable if the assumptions embedded in the DAG renders it expressible in terms of the observable distribution
P (V = .|W = w) [20]. When a selection mechanism is present, the question is the recoverability of the w-specific
causal odds-ratio in terms of the observable distribution P (V = .|W = w, S = 1) [19, 20]. If COR (X,R|W = w)
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is recoverable, it is equal to the adjusted odds-ratio OR (X,R|W = w, S = 1), i.e., OR (X,R|W = w,A = 1) in our
situation. If the w-specific causal odds-ratio is not recoverable, this also means that the estimable odds-ratio in
responsibility analyses is a biased measure of causal effect.
In previous works, we showed that COR (X,R|W = w) was not recoverable [5], thus COR (X,R|W = w) 6=
OR (X,R|W = w,A = 1). Here, to assess the magnitude of bias, we compare these quantities of interest:
COR (X,R|W = w) = P (R1 = 1|W = w) /P (R1 = 0|W = w)
P (R0 = 1|W = w) /P (R0 = 0|W = w) ,
OR (X,R|W = w,A = 1) = OR (X,F |W = w,A = 1) , because F = R when A = 1
=
P (F = 1|X = 1,W = w,A = 1) /P (F = 0|X = 1,W = w,A = 1)
P (F = 1|X = 0,W = w,A = 1) /P (F = 0|X = 0,W = w,A = 1)
We also consider:
COR (X,F |W = w) = P (F1 = 1|W = w) /P (F1 = 0|W = w)
P (F0 = 1|W = w) /P (F0 = 0|W = w)
because under additional assumptions, the causal odds-ratio COR (X,R|W = w) can be well approximated by an
other causal odds-ratio COR (X,F |W = w). This causal odds-ratio is indeed recoverable when there is for instance
no arrow pointing from X to V in the DAG, so that X ⊥ A| (F,W ) [5]. Moreover, if X ⊥ A| (F,W ) holds, then
COR (X,R|W = w) ' COR (X,F |W = w) [5]. That means that the estimable odds-ratio in responsibility analyses
can approximatively and unbiasedly estimate the causal odds-ratio of interest when the considered exposure X has
no effect on V .
To recap, as soon as X ⊥6 A| (F,W ), the estimable odds-ratio OR (X,R|W = w,A = 1) = OR (X,F |W = w,A = 1)
is different from COR (X,F |W = w) and COR (X,R|W = w). Consequently, our objective is to determine the mag-
nitude of the bias between the estimable odds-ratio and the causal odds-ratios depending on the deviation from
X ⊥ A| (F,W ).
1.2 Derivation
Since the DAG is associated to a set of structural functions, we have to specify these functions to calculate and com-
pare the three quantities of interest. The causal model described below is the full model consistent with Figure 1, i.e.,
with an arrow from X to V . The case where there is no arrow from X to V will be illustrated by setting a parameter
to zero in this full causal model. Note that we do not consider any sampling properties and hence we do not simu-
late data. Rather, we compare theoretical quantities under a given choice of a joint distribution of (X,V, F,A,W ) [24].
Suppose that W and X have distributions fW and fX , respectively. While our derivations allow the variables W
and X to take any form, the mathematics are clearer if we consider the binary case, with P (W = 1) = pW and
P (X = 1|W = w) = pX , and the other three variables generated by the following regression equations:
P (V = 1|W = w) = pV (x,w) = h (α0 + αXx+ αWw + αXWxw)
P (F = 1|X = x, V = v,W = w) = pF (x, v, w) = h (β0 + βXx+ βV v + βWw + βXV xv + βXWxw + βVW vw)
P (A = 1|F = f, V = v,W = w) = pA (f, v, w) = h (γ0 + γF f + γV v + γWw + γFV fv + γFW fw + γVW vw) .
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with h (x) = (1 + exp (−x))−1.
Keep in mind that R = F ×A, so we do not need generate the distribution of R by a regression equation.
Consequently, the three quantities of interest COR (X,R|W = w), COR (X,F |W = w) and OR (X,R|W = w,A = 1)
previously defined can be specified. Indeed, we have:
P (Rx = 1|W = w) = P (Ax = 1, Fx = 1|W = w)
= P (Ax = 1, Fx = 1|X = x,W = w) because (Ax, Fx)⊥ X|W
= P (A = 1, F = 1|X = x,W = w) by consistency
= P (A = 1|F = 1, X = x,W = w)P (F = 1|X = x,W = w)
=
∑
v∈(0,1)
{P (A = 1|F = 1, V = v,W = w)P (F = 1|X = x, V = v,W = w)P (V = v|X = x,W = w)}
= pA (1, 1, w) pF (x, 1, w) pV (x,w) + pA (1, 0, w) pF (x, 0, w) (1− pV (x,w))
blabla
P (Fx = 1|W = w) = P (Fx = 1|X = x,W = w) because Fx ⊥ X|W
= P (F = 1|X = x,W = w) by consistency
=
∑
v∈(0,1)
{P (F = 1|X = x, V = v,W = w)P (V = v|X = x,W = w)}
= pF (x, 1, w) pV (x,w) + pF (x, 0, w) (1− pV (x,w))
blabla
P (R = 1|X = x,W = w,A = 1) = P (F = 1|X = x,W = w,A = 1) because R = F when A = 1
=
P (F = 1, X = x,W = w,A = 1)
P (X = x,W = w,A = 1)
=
P (A = 1|F = 1, X = x,W = w)P (F = 1, X = x,W = w)
P (A = 1|X = x,W = w)P (X = x|W = w)P (W = w)
=
∑
v∈(0,1)
{P (A = 1|F = 1, V = v,W = w)P (F = 1|X = x, V = v,W = w)P (V = v|X = x,W = w)}
n∑
v,f∈(0,1)
{P (A = 1|F = f, V = v,W = w)P (F = f |X = x, V = v,W = w)P (V = v|X = x,W = w)}
= [pA (1, 1, w) pF (x, 1, w) pV (x,w) + pA (1, 0, w) pF (x, 0, w) (1− pV (x,w))]
× [pA (1, 1, w) pF (x, 1, w) pV (x,w) + pA (1, 0, w) pF (x, 0, w) (1− pV (x,w))
+ pA (0, 1, w) (1− pF (x, 1, w)) pV (x,w) + pA (0, 0, w) (1− pF (x, 0, w)) (1− pV (x,w))]−1
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Throughout, we set pX = pW = 0.5 and, for ν = 13,
α0 = −1
2
(
αX + αW +
1
2
αXW
)
β0 = −1
2
(
βX + βV + βW +
1
2
(βXV + βXW + βVW )− ν
)
γ0 = −1
2
(
γF + γV + γW
1
2
(βFV + βFW + βVW )− ν
)
so that the prevalence P (V = 1) = 0.5 and the prevalences of F and A remain inferior to 10−6%, i.e., close to reality
[25].
We remind the reader that our objective is to determine the magnitude of the bias between the estimable odds-ratio
OR (X,R|W = w,A = 1) and the causal odds-ratios COR (X,R|W = w) or COR (X,F |W = w), depending on the
difference from X⊥ A| (F,W ). So, we first vary the parameters αX and γV . For γV , we consider three configurations:
γV = 0, which describes the situation where there is no arrow from V to A, γV = 1.5 and γV = 3. For αX , on one
hand, we vary αX from 0 to 3, which describes a situation where X could represent alcohol and would increase speed.
Indeed, it is commonly admitted that alcohol increases the risk to drive fast. On the other hand, we vary αX from
-3 to 0, which could describe a situation where X would represent cannabis. The effect of cannabis on speed has not
been established yet, so this result is illustrated by the situation where αX = 0. In addition, we suppose that the
cannabis could decrease speed for illustration. We also set βV = 1 and γF = 4 since V increases the risk of commiting
a driving fault and F largely increases the risk to have an accident.
2 Results
Confusion but no interaction
In Figures 2 and 3, we can vizualise the value of logCOR (X,R|W = w),logCOR (X,F |W = w), and
logOR (X,R|W = w,A = 1), for different values of αX , γV and αW when βW = γW = 1 and all interaction
terms are set to zero.
Let us first consider the case where αW = 0 (first column of 2 and 3). The left top panel of these Figures with γV = 0
illustrate the absence of bias between the three quantities if there had not been an arrow pointing from V to A. In
this hypothetical case, X⊥ A| (F,W ) would hold so that COR (X,F |W = w) would be recoverable and consequently
COR (X,R|W = w) ' OR (X,R|W = w,A = 1). When the inclusion depends on the accident severity, i.e. γV 6= 0
(second and third rows), there is some bias between COR (X,R|W = w) and OR (X,R|W = w,A = 1) as soon as
αX 6= 0, and the magnitude of this bias increases with αX (see Figure 2). As expected, the higher γV and αX are, the
bigger the magnitude of the bias is. Because we move away from X ⊥ A| (F,W ). This last condition is also useful for
the approximation of COR (X,R|W = w) by COR (X,F |W = w). By consequence, as soon as γV 6= 0, there is some
bias between COR (X,R|W = w) and COR (X,F |W = w). However, if αX = 0, there is no bias between the three
quantities. In this case, there is no arrow pointing from X to V (so V ∈ W ) and X ⊥ A| (F,W ) holds. Note that
when X increases the risk to drive fast (αX varying from 0 to 3) (see Figure 2), the estimable odds-ratio available
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in responsibility analyses OR (X,R|W = w,A = 1) underestimates the two causal effects COR (X,F |W = w) and
COR (X,R|W = w). Conversely, in the case where X decreases the risk to drive fast (αX varying from -3 to 0)
(see Figure 3), OR (X,R|W = w,A = 1) overestimates the two causal effects. Moreover, when αX ≤ −2, a reverse
direction of the estimable odds-ratio to the causal effect of interest can occur. In this latter case, the causal effect of
X on R would be protective (log COR (X,R|W = w) < 0) although the estimable odds-ratio available suggests that
X increases the risk for being responsible of a severe accident (log OR (X,R|W = w,A = 1) > 0). In other words,
under the simple model considered here, it is possible to observe OR (X,R|W = w,A = 1) < 1 and to conclude, if
cannabis is likely to decrease the risk to drive fast, that cannabis increases the risk for being responsible for a severe
accident, although it decreases this risk.
Now, let us consider the cases where αW > 0 (second, third and fourth colums of 2 and 3), which means that
the binary confounder increases the risk to drive fast, as for instance to be a young driver. As expected, the
bias between the three quantities increases with αX , whatever the values of γV and αW , and for w ∈ (0, 1).
For a given value of γV , the bias between COR (X,R|W = 0) and COR (X,F |W = 0) increases although it de-
creases between COR (X,R|W = 1) and COR (X,F |W = 1). However, the bias between COR (X,F |W = w) and
OR (X,R|W = w,A = 1) decreases whatever the stratum W . It seems that we move away from X ⊥ A| (F,W )
in the stratum where {W = 0}, e.g. P (A = 1|X = 1, F = f,W = 0) /P (A = 1|X = 0, F = f,W = 0) moves away
from 1, when αW increases. Conversely, we come near X ⊥ A| (F,W ) in the stratum where {W = 1} e.g.
P (A = 1|X = 1, F = f,W = 0) /P (A = 1|X = 0, F = f,W = 0) approaches 1. These assumptions are confirmed by
computing the relative risks in each stratum of W (see Appendix Table 1).
Finally, as soon as γV 6= 0, the estimable odds-ratio available in responsibility analyses OR (X,R|W = w,A = 1) bet-
ter estimates COR (X,F |W = w) than COR (X,R|W = w). For instance, when the exposure X is likely to increase
V (αX > 0) (see Figure 2), COR (X,F |W = w) ≤ COR (X,R|W = w) (see Appendix A.2 for the proof). On the
other hand, OR (X,R|W = w,A = 1) ≤ COR (X,F |W = w) and OR (X,R|W = w,A = 1) ≤ COR (X,R|W = w)
according to the numerical illustration. It is therefore not surprising that OR (X,R|W = w,A = 1) better estimates
COR (X,F |W = w) than COR (X,R|W = w).
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Figure 2: Causal and associational effect on the log scale in the case where βV = βX = βW = γW = 1,
γF = 4, without interaction, and for varying values of the other parameters αX , αW , γV . In each panel, along
the x axis, αX varies from 0 to 3
αW = 0 αW = 1 αW = 2 αW = 3
1.0
1.2
1.4
1.6
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
γV
=
0
γV
=
1.5
γV
=
3
0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3
log COR(X,F|W=0) log COR(X,F|W=1) log COR(X,R|W=0) log COR(X,R|W=1) log OR(X,R|W=0,A=1) log OR(X,R|W=1,A=1)
Confusion and interactions
In the presence of a confounder, the variation of interaction terms βXW , βVW , γFW , γFV marginally changes the value
and the magnitude of the bias. That is the reason why we do not present these results and we set these iteraction
terms to 0. We then study the variation of the bias in the presence of interaction terms αXW and βXV for αW = 2,
βW = 1 and γW = 1.
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Figure 3: Causal and associational effect on the log scale in the case where βV = βX = βW = γW = 1,
γF = 4, without interaction, and for varying values of the other parameters αX , αW , γV . In each panel, along
the x axis, αX varies from −3 to 0
αW = 0 αW = 1 αW = 2 αW = 3
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
−0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
−1.0
−0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
γV
=
0
γV
=
1.5
γV
=
3
−3 −2 −1 0 −3 −2 −1 0 −3 −2 −1 0 −3 −2 −1 0
log COR(X,F|W=0) log COR(X,F|W=1) log COR(X,R|W=0) log COR(X,R|W=1) log OR(X,R|W=0,A=1) log OR(X,R|W=1,A=1)
The interaction terms on high speed αXW can illustrate an interaction between alcohol or cannabis consumption
with the fact of being a young driver. For instance, it may be assumed that young drivers who consume alcohol take
excessive risks, and drive faster than other drivers.
According to Figures 4 and 5, the variation and the magnitude of bias between the three effects depend on the stratum
W . When αX varies from 0 to 3, the bias seems to be constant in the stratum where {W = 0}. However, the bias
increases with αXW in the stratum where {W = 1}. Indeed, we deviate from X ⊥ A| (F,W ) in the stratum where
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Figure 4: Causal and associational effect on the log scale in the case where βV = βX = βW = γW = 1,
γF = 4, αW = 2, and for varying values of the other parameters αX , αXW , γV . In each panel, along the x
axis, αX varies from 0 to 3
αXW = 0 αXW = 1 αXW = 2 αXW = 3
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1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
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2.0
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3.0
γV
=
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γV
=
1.5
γV
=
3
0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3
log COR(X,F|W=0) log COR(X,F|W=1) log COR(X,R|W=0) log COR(X,R|W=1) log OR(X,R|W=0,A=1) log OR(X,R|W=1,A=1)
{W = 1} although the difference to X ⊥ A| (F,W ) is constant when {W = 0} (see Appendix Table 1). As expected,
the variation of αXW has a larger impact on COR (X,R|W = 1) and, to a lesser extent, on COR (X,F |W = 1),
than on other effects. As already mentioned, we move away from X ⊥ A| (F,W ) when αXW increases in the
stratum where {W = 1}. Consequently, P (A = 1|F = f,X = 1,W = 1) /P (A = 1|F = f,X = 0,W = 1) is more and
more superior than COR (X,F |W = 1). Moreover, note that there is a bias between the three quantities in the
presence of αXW even when αX = 0 in the stratum {W = 1}. In this case, X ⊥6 A| (F,W ) and the relative risk
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P (A = 1|X = 1, F = f,W = 1) /P (A = 1|X = 0, F = f,W = 1) is different from 1, because it depends on αXW , and
not only on αX anymore. The difference between the three quantities is all the more important that αXW is high.
In the presence of the interaction term αXW , causal effects conditioned on W = 1 are therefore superior to causal
effects conditioned on W = 0 when αX = 0. When αX increases, the curves intersect. And the higher αXW is, the
higher the threshold αX where the curves intersect is.
When αX varies from -3 to 0 (see Figure 5), the interaction term αXW induces a bias between the three quan-
tities as soon as γV and αX 6= 0. In the stratum where {W = 0}, the bias remains constant despite of the
αXW increase. In this stratum, the αXW increase marginally changes the difference from X ⊥ A| (F,W ), e.g.
P (A = 1|X = 1, F = f,W = 0) /P (A = 1|X = 0, F = f,W = 0) remains constant (see Appendix Table 2). However,
in the stratum where {W = 1}, the αXW increase first reduces the bias between the three quantities. Indeed,
P (A = 1|X = 1, F = f,W = 1) /P (A = 1|X = 0, F = f,W = 1) approaches and reaches 1, and after moves away (see
Appendix Table 2). This result is not surprising since αX varies from -3 to 0 and αXW varies from -1 to 2. Conse-
quently, P (A = 1|X = 1, F = f,W = 1) /P (A = 1|X = 0, F = f,W = 1) = 1 when αX + αXW = 0.
The interaction term βXV changes the value of the effects but not the magnitude of the bias (see Figures 6 and 7 in
Appendix A.3). Therefore, the introduction and the variation of βXV do not change the difference from X⊥ A| (F,W ),
e.g. the relative risk P (A = 1|X = 1, F = f,W = w) /P (A = 1|X = 0, F = f,W = w) remains constant (see Appendix
Table 1 when αX varies from 0 to 3, and 2 when αX varies from -3 to 0). Note that the introduction of interaction
term βXV creates a bias between the three quantities as soon as γV 6= 0 and even if αX = 0.
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Figure 5: Causal and associational effect on the log scale in the case where βV = βX = βW = γW = 1,
γF = 4, αW = 2, and for varying values of the other parameters αX , αXW , γV . In each panel, along the x
axis, αX varies from -3 to 0
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log COR(X,F|W=0) log COR(X,F|W=1) log COR(X,R|W=0) log COR(X,R|W=1) log OR(X,R|W=0,A=1) log OR(X,R|W=1,A=1)
.
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3 Discussion
In this article, and under the causal model considered here, we show with numerical results that the estimable odds-
ratio in responsibility analyses is a biased measure of the causal effect of interest as soon as selection depends on
the crash severity, i.e. γV 6= 0, and the exposure X is correlated with high speed V , i.e. αX 6= 0. When these two
conditions are not guaranteed, the independance X ⊥ A| (F,W ) does not hold. We also show that the magnitude of
the bias depends on the deviation from X ⊥ A| (F,W ) and so above all on the parameters αX and γV . We illustrate
the variation of the magnitude of the bias by varying another set of parameters. The presence of a confounder having
an impact on high speed changes the deviation from X ⊥ A| (F,W ) but in a lesser extent than the variation of αX or
γV do. Results are similar when we introduce an interaction term between X and W on high speed V . However, the
introduction and the variation of the interaction between X and V on the fault F does not change the magnitude of
the bias but the value of the effects only.
Thanks to our numerical illustration, we are able to comment the direction and the magnitude of the bias that occurs
in responsibility analyses. When X is likely to increase the risk to drive fast V , such as alcohol, the estimable odds-
ratio available in responsibility analyses underestimates the causal effect of interest, especially when αX and γV are
high. When X is likely to decrease the risk to drive fast V , the estimable odds-ratio overestimates the causal effect.
The relationship between the log of the effects varies from 0 to 1.5. That means that the bias between the different
quantities considered here varies from 1 to 5. In the case where X is likely to decrease the risk to drive fast V , a reverse
direction of the estimable odds-ratio to the causal effect of interest can occur. In that latter case, the causal effect of
X on R would be protective (log COR (X,R|W = w) < 0) although the estimable odds-ratio available suggests that
X increases the risk for being responsible of a severe accident (log OR (X,R|W = w,A = 1) > 0). In other words,
under the causal model considered here, it is possible to observe OR (X,R|W = w,A = 1) < 1 and to conclude, if
cannabis was likely to decrease the risk to drive fast, that cannabis would increase the risk for being responsible for a
severe accident, although it would decrease that risk. Note that cannabis intoxication has no exciting effect on speed
compared to alcohol but it increases the risk of commiting a driving fault F .
However, we get our results under a simple causal model with only one confounder. To be more realistic, it will be
interesting to consider a set of categorical confounders for future research. Moreover, we present all results in the
stratum of the population defined by W = w, because theoretical results on the recoverability of causal effect in the
presence of selection mechanism are presented in the stratum of the population defined by W = w [19, 20]. Even if the
recoverability of the w-specific COR (X,R|W = w) is not sufficient to conclude on the population causal odds-ratio
COR (X,R), COR (X,R|W = w) is still useful to derive estimates of population attributable fractions (PAF) (see
Appendix C in [5]). Consequently, our numerical results are also useful to discuss recent estimations of attributable
fractions, as the one estimated by [26] for instance.
Indeed, in the recent study named ActuSAM, [26] compare the effect of alcohol consumption and the effect of cannabis
intoxication on the risk of being responsible among drivers invoved in a fatal crash. This study concludes that drivers
under the influence of alcohol are 17.8 times (12.1-26.1) more likely to be responsible for a fatal accident. Concerning
cannabis intoxication, the ActuSAM study concludes that drivers under the influence of cannabis multiply their risk
of being responsible for causing a fatal accident by 1.65 (1.16-2.34). By comparing the estimations (17.8 vs 1.65), and
above all population attributable fractions (PAF) (27.7% vs 4.2%), the authors conclude that alcohol consumption
remains the main problem on the french roads. Our previous results are useful to discuss the estimated attributable
13
fractions. For instance, in the case of alcohol, it is commonly admitted that alcohol increases the risk to drive fast.
Thus, our results suggest that the attributable fraction concerning alcohol would be underestimated. Regarding
cannabis intoxication, the effect of cannabis on speed has not been established yet. In this situation, our results
suggest that the attributable fraction estimated in the ActuSAM is unbiased, provided that the relevant confounders
have been taken into account. Our new findings do not negate the global conclusion of the study, because alcohol
remains a major health problem on french roads.
The ActuSAM study also considers different blood alcohol concentrations. The higher the blood alcohol concentra-
tion, the higher the risk of being responsible for a fatal crash. Simple results (without confounders and interaction)
regarding the magnitude of the bias when X is a categorical variable are available in Appendix A.4. Results are
similar to the binary case where X is likely to increase the risk to drive fast V . Indeed, the estimable odds-ratios
also underestimates the causal effects. For the highest blood alcohol concentrations, though the bias is less important
because we suppose that the highest blood alcohol concentrations have a lesser impact on the risk to drive fast than
the lowest concentrations. This assumption is based on the results from a linear regression model of speed on alcohol
and cannabis adjusted on the same set of confounders than the ones choosen in the ActuSAM study: age, gender,
vehicle category and time of accident. Nevertheless, this assumption is questionable because it is based on biased
estimations. Indeed, collider bias still occurs in the relationship between X and V after conditioning on A, if we
implement the model on the case and on control groups. We have knowledge that unbiased estimations are obtained
by realising the modelisation of V on the control subpopulation [27]. However, there are not enough drunk drivers in
the subpopulation of nonresponsible drivers to implement that solution.
Consequently, this warrants further research on the magnitude of bias. On the one hand, it would be interest-
ing to study the magnitude of the bias when one wants to assess the effect of a given exposure on speed. We
could compare the three quantities: COR (X,V |W = w), OR (X,V |W = w,A = 1) and OR (X,V |W = w,A = 1).
On the other hand, it would be useful to compare the magnitude of the bias between COR (X,R|W = w,A = 1)
and OR (X,R|W = w,A = 1). Indeed, we have shown that OR (X,R|W = w,A = 1) 6= COR (X,R|W = w) but
OR (X,R|W = w,A = 1) is also not equal to COR (X,R|W = w,A = 1) [5]. Similarly to what we presented in [2],
we would have to derive an analytic expression of COR (X,R|W = w,A = 1), and this type of derivation could be
also used in other fields than road safety epidemiology [28].
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A Appendix
A.1 Relative risks P (A = 1|X = 1, F = f,W = w) /P (A = 1|X = 0, F = f,W = w)
We can compute the relative risk by deriving P (A = 1|X = x, F = f,W = 1). Indeed, P (A = 1|X = x, F = f,W = 1) =∑
v∈(0,1){P (A = 1|X = x, V = v,W = w)P (F = 1|X = x, V = v,W = w)P (V = v|X = x,W = w) = pA (f, 1, w) pV (x,w)+
pA (f, 0, w) (1− pV (x,w)). Whatever f ∈ (0, 1), the relative risks marginally vary, by consequence, we present the
relative risks for f = 1.
Table 1: Relative risk P (A = 1|X = 1, F = f,W = w) /P (A = 1|X = 0, F = f,W = w) for αX = 1 and γV =
3 and different values of αW , αXW , βXV
αW = 0 αW = 1 αW = 2 αW = 3
{W = 1} 1,57 1,42 1,29 1,19
{W = 0} 1,57 1,72 1,83 1,87
αXW = 0 αXW = 1 αXW = 2 αXW = 3
{W = 1} 1,28 1,55 1,81 2,09
{W = 0} 1,83 1,86 1,87 1,86
βXV = 0 βXV = 1 βXV = 2 βXV = 3
{W = 1} 1,28 1,29 1,29 1,29
{W = 0} 1,83 1,83 1,83 1,83
Table 2: Relative risks P (A = 1|X = 1, F = f,W = w) /P (A = 1|X = 0, F = f,W = w) for αX = −1 and
γV = 3 and different values of αXW and βXV
αXW = −1 αXW = 0 αXW = 1 αXW = 2
{W = 1} 0,54 0,77 1,00 1,19
{W = 0} 0,56 0,55 0,53 0,53
βXV = 0 βXV = 1 βXV = 2 βXV = 3
{W = 1} 0,77 0,77 0,78 0,78
{W = 0} 0,55 0,54 0,55 0,55
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A.2 Direction of bias
Let us fisrt consider the case where X represents alcohol and has a positive effect on the risk to drive fast (αX varying
from 0 to 3). On the one hand, we can show that as soon as γV 6= 0, COR (X,F |W = w) ≤ COR (X,R|W = w).
Indeed, remind the proof of the approximation of COR (X,R|W = w) by COR (X,F |W = w) when X ⊥ A| (F,W ):
COR (X,R|W = w) ≈ CRR (X,R|W = w) if P (Rx = 1|W = w) small
=
P (R1 = 1|W = w)
P (R0 = 1|W = w)
=
P (F1 = 1, A1 = 1|W = w)
P (F0 = 1, A0 = 1|W = w)
=
P (F1 = 1, A1 = 1|X = 1,W = w)
P (F0 = 1, A0 = 1|X = 0,W = w)
=
P (F = 1, A = 1|X = 1,W = w)
P (F = 1, A = 1|X = 0,W = w) since (Ax, Fx)⊥ X|W
=
P (A = 1|F = 1, X = 1,W = w)P (F = 1|X = 1,W = w)
P (A = 1|F = 1, X = 0,W = w)P (F = 1|X = 0,W = w)
=
P (A = 1|F = 1,W = w)P (F = 1|X = 1,W = w)
P (A = 1|F = 1,W = w)P (F = 1|X = 0,W = w) since X ⊥ A| (F,W )
=
P (F = 1|X = 1,W = w)
P (F = 1|X = 0,W = w)
=
P (F1 = 1|W = w)
P (F0 = 1|W = w) since Fx ⊥ X|W
= CRR (X,F |W = w)
≈ COR (X,F |W = w) if P (Fx = 1|W = w) small
When γV 6= 0, X ⊥6 A| (F,W ), so that P(A=1|F=1,X=1,W=w)P(A=1|F=1,X=0,W=w) 6= P(A=1|F=1,W=w)P(A=1|F=1,W=w) . In the case where X increases
the risk to drive fast, P(A=1|F=1,X=1,W=w)P(A=1|F=1,X=0,W=w) ≥ P(A=1|F=1,W=w)P(A=1|F=1,W=w) , and so COR (X,F |W = w) ≤ COR (X,R|W = w).
On the other hand, according to the numerical illustrations, OR (X,R|W = w,A = 1) ≤ COR (X,F |W = w) and
OR (X,R|W = w,A = 1) ≤ COR (X,R|W = w). It is therefore not surprising that OR (X,R|W = w,A = 1) better
estimates COR (X,F |W = w) than COR (X,R|W = w).
When X represents cannabis intoxication and decreases the risk to drive fast (αX varying from -3 to
0), analogous reasoning can be applied. On the one hand, P(A=1|F=1,X=1,W=w)P(A=1|F=1,X=0,W=w) ≤ P(A=1|F=1,W=w)P(A=1|F=1,W=w) , and
COR (X,F |W = w) ≥ COR (X,R|W = w). On the other hand, and according to the numerical illustra-
tions, OR (X,R|W = w,A = 1) ≥ COR (X,F |W = w) and OR (X,R|W = w,A = 1) ≥ COR (X,R|W = w).
OR (X,R|W = w,A = 1) better estimates COR (X,F |W = w) than COR (X,R|W = w).
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A.3 Figures for varying values of βXV
Figure 6: Causal and associational effect on the log scale in the case where βV = βX = βW = γW = 1,
γF = 4, αW = 2, and for varying values of the other parameters αX , βXV , γV . In each panel, along the x
axis, αX varies from 0 to 3
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Figure 7: Causal and associational effect on the log scale in the case where βV = βX = βW = γW = 1,
γF = 4, αW = 2, and for varying values of the other parameters αX , βXV , γV . In each panel, along the x
axis, αX varies from −3 to 0.
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A.4 X as a categorical variable
A.4.1 Derivation
In this part, we consider the exposure X as a categorical variable with J + 1 levels xj ∈ (x0, x1, ..., xJ). X is
transformed in J binary variables Xj , equal to 1 if X equals xj , 0 otherwise for j ≥ 1. So, for each binary variable
Xj , we compare COR (Xj , F |W = w), COR (Xj , R|W = w) and OR (Xj , R|W = w,A = 1) defined as follow:
COR (Xj , F |W = w) = P (Fj = 1|W = w) /P (Fj = 0|W = w)P (F0 = 1|W = w) /P (F0 = 0|W = w) ,
COR (Xj , R|W = w) = P (Rj = 1|W = w) /P (Rj = 0|W = w)P (R0 = 1|W = w) /P (R0 = 0|W = w) ,
OR (Xj , R|W = w,A = 1) = P (F = 1|X = xj ,W = w,A = 1) /P (F = 0|X = xj ,W = w,A = 1)P (F = 1|X = x0,W = w,A = 1) /P (F = 0|X = x0,W = w,A = 1) .
where Fj and Rj are the conterfactual outcome of F and R respectively, that we would be observed if the exposure
had been set to X = xj for xj ∈ (x0, x1, x2, x3, x4).
As before, we note P (W = 1) = pW and P (Xj = 1|W = w) = pXj . The other three variables are generated by
regression equations:
pV (xj , w) = h
(
α0 + αXjxj + αWw
)
pF (xj , v, w) = h
(
β0 + βXjxj + βV v + βWw + βVW vw
)
pA (f, v, w) = h (γ0 + γF f + γV v + γWw + γFV fv + γFW fw + γVW vw) .
Throughout, X is a categorical variable with J + 1 = 5 levels: x0 the reference, and x1, x2 ,x3 ,x4 the other levels.
So, we set pXj = 0.2 and pW = 0.5. For ν = 13, we set
α0 = −1
5
(
αX1 + αX2 + αX3 + αX4 +
5
2
αW
)
β0 = −1
5
(
βX1 + βX2 + βX3 + βX4 +
5
2
(βV + βW ) +
5
4
βVW − ν
)
γ0 = −1
2
(
γF + γV + γW +
1
2
(βFV + βFW + βVW )− ν
)
so that the prevalence P (V = 1) = 0.5 and the prevalences of F and A remain inferior to 10−6%, i.e., prevalences
close to reality again [25].
As in the binary case, we study the magnitude of bias between the estimable odds-ratio and the causal odds-ratios
depending on the difference from Xj ⊥ A| (F,W ). So, we vary first the parameters αXj and γV from 0 to 3. On the
other hand, we set:
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
αX1
αX2 = 0.80αX1
αX3 = 0.25αX1
αX4 = 0.20αX1

βX1 = 1
βX2 = 2.50βX1
βX3 = 3.50βX1
βX4 = 3.40βX1
These relationships can describe a situation where X would represent different blood alcohol concentrations. It is well
known that alcohol increases speed for the low-dose of alcohol, and decreases it for the highest ones [29, 30]. On the
other hand, the higher blood alcohol concentration is, the higher the risk of commiting a driving fault is. Finally, we
present results with βV = 1 and γF = 4 always because V increases the risk to commit a driving fault and F largely
increases the risk to have an accident.
A.4.2 Results
Figure 8 vizualise results where X is a categorical variable, with 5 levels. We find similar results as the binary case. For
each level j, Xj ⊥ A| (F,W ) when γV = 0, and there is no bias between COR (Xj , F |W = w), COR (Xj , R|W = w)
and OR (X,R|W = w,A = 1), whatever the value αX1 . As soon as γV 6= 0 and αX1 6= 0, bias appear between the
three quantities and the magnitude of the bias increases with αX1 , and so with αXj . The bias are all the more impor-
tant that αXj and γV are important, because we move away from Xj⊥ A| (F,W ). Note that the lower the relationship
between αXj and αX1 is, the lower the bias between the three quantities are. Finally, OR (X,R|W = w,A = 1)
underestimates the two causal effects COR (Xj , R|W = w) and COR (Xj , R|W = w) since each Xj variable increases
the risk to drive fast.
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Figure 8: Causal and associational effect for each level j on the log scale in the case where βV = βX1 = 1,
γF = 4 and for varying values of the other parameters αX1 and γV . In each panel, along the x axis, αXj
varies from 0 to 3.
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